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What Financing Data Reveal about Dealer Leverage
Tobias Adrian and Michael J. Fleming
The Federal Reserve collects data on the financing activities of the primary government securities
dealers. Some market analysts argue that the data show a considerable rise in dealer leverage 
in recent years. However, a close reading of the data suggests that dealer borrowing involving
fixed-income securities has grown only modestly. Moreover, the increase that has occurred is 
not clearly associated with greater risk taking.
T
he Federal Reserve collects market data from
the dealers with which it has a trading rela-
tionship—the so-called primary dealers.The
data cover transactions,positions,financing,and settle-
ment activities in U.S.Treasury securities,agency debt
securities,mortgage-backed securities (MBS),and corpo-
rate debt securities. The data are consolidated and
released publicly by the Fed and used by market analysts
to monitor market conditions and the activities of
primary dealers.
Some market analysts claim that the financing data
show a substantial rise in dealer leverage in recent years.
A common argument is that low short-term interest rates
have spurred a large number of carry trades—transac-
tions in which market participants borrow money on a
short-term basis and invest in higher yielding long-term
assets.Such trades increase investors’exposure to interest
rate changes.A consequent concern is that rises in interest
rates could lead to large trading losses,a rapid deleverag-
ing,and high volatility.1
This edition of Current Issues examines what the 
primary dealer financing data can tell us about dealer
leverage. We begin by reviewing why and how dealers
engage in financing activities. We then discuss which
financing data are reported to the Fed,which data the Fed
releases,and what the data mean.From these data,we cal-
culate and evaluate two measures of dealer leverage and
discuss the relationship between our preferred leverage
measure—net financing—and dealer risk taking.Lastly,
we analyze the relationship between net financing,interest
rates,and interest rate volatility.
Our analysis of the financing data indicates that dealer
borrowing involving fixed-income securities has grown
only modestly in recent years.Moreover,because the rise is
not associated with increased net positions,there is little
evidence to suggest greater risk taking.Nonetheless,we do
find some evidence to support the idea that dealer leverage
is related to interest rates and volatility. In particular,
financing tends to decline both before and after increases
in interest rates and volatility.
How and Why Financing Occurs
Financing activities provide the funds and securities
needed by market participants when they trade securities.
Primary dealers buy and sell fixed-income securities for
several reasons: to make markets for their customers,to
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take speculative positions,and to hedge positions in deriva-
tives and other fixed-income securities.
A dealer taking a long position by buying a security must
pay the seller. If the dealer does not pay out of available
funds,it has to finance the position by borrowing.Dealers
typically do this by providing securities they already own as
collateral for the loan.For example,a dealer financing the
purchase of a Treasury security could borrow funds from a
corporate treasurer while providing another fixed-income
security as collateral.
Conversely,a dealer taking a short position by selling a
security it does not own must deliver the security to the
buyer.A short position is financed by borrowing the security
while providing cash or other securities as collateral. For
instance,a dealer selling short a Treasury note could borrow
the note from a mutual fund and provide cash as collateral.
Several types of transactions are used to finance long and
short positions,but all are essentially equivalent to the col-
lateralized borrowings described above. In a repurchase
agreement (repo),for example,an investor sells a security
while agreeing to buy it back at a higher price on a future
date.From the perspective of the funds lender—which buys
a security while agreeing to resell it—such agreements are
called reverse repos.
In a securities lending transaction, an investor lends a
security while accepting another security or cash as collat-
eral.If cash is offered as collateral,then the securities lender
pays the borrower a cash collateral fee.When another secu-
rity is offered as collateral,the securities borrower pays the
lender a fee for the benefit of borrowing a specific security.
What Is Reported and by Whom
Market data are reported to the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York by the primary government securities dealers. The
dealers represent an important but limited subset of the
fixed-income market. Moreover, dealer reporting entities
may not include all trading activities of the larger organiza-
tions of which they are a part.Furthermore,additions to and
withdrawals from the list of primary dealers as well as inter-
nal reorganizations change the dealer population over time.2
Dealers report (via form FR 2004) their transactions,
positions, financing, and settlement activities in U.S.
Treasury securities,agency debt securities,MBS,and corpo-
rate debt securities.3Reporting occurs weekly,as of the close
of business each Wednesday,for broad categories of securi-
ties.4 Data are submitted by 4:00 p.m.the following business
day,usually Thursday,through the Federal Reserve’s Internet
Electronic Submission System.
The Fed publicly releases summary data each Thursday at
4:15 p.m.,one week after the data are collected.5The data are
aggregated across all dealers and are available only for broad
categories of securities;individual issue data and individual
dealer data are not made public.Table 1 shows the financing
data reported for May 19,2004,from the release of May 27.
Dealer Financing Data
Dealer financing is reported on a gross basis,distinguishing
between “securities in”and “securities out”for each asset
class.Securities in refer to securities received by a dealer in a
financing arrangement,whereas securities out refer to secu-
rities delivered by a dealer.For instance,if a dealer enters
into a repo,in which it borrows funds and provides securi-
ties as collateral,it would report securities out.If a dealer
enters into a security-for-security transaction, it would
report both securities in and securities out.
In addition,repos and reverse repos are reported across
all asset classes combined.These memo items are subsets of
the broader securities-in and securities-out figures, and
reveal the share of dealer financing conducted through these
particular transactions.On May 19,2004,outstanding repos
totaled $2,743 billion, accounting for 89 percent of the
$3,076 billion in securities out across all asset classes (calcu-
lated from Table 1).In contrast,reverse repos of $2,022 bil-
lion represented only 69 percent of the $2,929 billion in
securities in.
The financing data are also broken down by the length of
the financing arrangement.Overnight and continuing (or
open) agreements refer to financing activities that are either
for one business day or that can be terminated on demand
by either party, but otherwise continue indefinitely. Term
agreements refer to financing activities that have an original
specified length of more than one business day.
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Table 1
Financing by Primary Dealers
Amount Outstanding as of May 19,2004 (Billions of Dollars)
Overnight and
Type of Financing Continuing Term Total
Securities in
U.S.Treasury securities 948.4 1,082.5 2,031.0
Agency debt securities 192.6 210.5 403.1
Mortgage-backed securities 56.4 292.2 348.6
Corporate debt securities 99.8 46.7 146.5
Securities out
U.S.Treasury securities 822.7  982.5 1,805.2
Agency debt securities 319.7  145.7 465.4
Mortgage-backed securities 384.2 198.9 583.1
Corporate debt securities 184.7  37.4 222.2
Memo:
Reverse repurchase agreements 646.1 1,375.4 2,021.5
Repurchase agreements 1,452.3 1,290.8 2,743.1
Source:Federal Reserve Bank of New York.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 3
The financing figures reported are the actual funds paid
or received. In the case of a repo, for example, a dealer
reports the funds received on the settlement of the repo,and
not the value of the pledged securities.When only securities
are exchanged, the dealer reports the market value of the
pledged securities.
Periodic Changes in the Dealer Reports
The Fed considers changes to the dealer reports every three
years to improve market monitoring while limiting the
reporting burden. The last major set of changes com-
menced with the reports for the week ending July 4,2001.
Asset classes covered by the reports were expanded to
include corporate debt securities.Moreover,the financing
data became more detailed by providing information by
asset class.
In other ways,the financing data became less detailed in
July 2001.Until then,dealers reported financing by the type
of transaction employed,and not just total financing and
repo financing.The earlier data are instructive,as they reveal
that securities borrowing transactions account for the over-
whelming majority of securities-in transactions that are not
reverse repos.Thus,when dealers borrow funds,they rely
largely on repos,but when they borrow securities,they rely
on both reverse repos and securities borrowing transactions.
Most of the securities borrowed are against cash rather than
against other securities.6
Interpreting Dealer Financing Data
Net Repo Financing
Some market observers contend that the financing data
show a marked rise in dealer leverage in recent years.This
interpretation is typically based on an analysis limited to the
repo data.In particular,net repo financing—the net amount
of funds primary dealers borrow through fixed-income
security repos—is calculated as repos minus reverse repos.
The measure has indeed increased strongly in recent years
(Chart 1),and was $722 billion on May 19,2004 (calculated
from Table 1).
However,net repo financing is an incomplete and poten-
tially misleading measure of dealer leverage. First and 
foremost, it does not account for transactions that are
essentially equivalent to repos but not reported as such.In
particular, securities lending transactions perform the
same economic function as repos but are not reported as
repos in the financing data.Another drawback is that the
asset classes covered by the measure have changed over
time, most recently being expanded to include corporate
debt securities in July 2001.
Net Financing
A measure ofdealer leverage that addresses some ofthe draw-
backs of the net repo financing measure is net financing.Net
financing, calculated as securities out minus securities in,
gauges the net amount of funds primary dealers borrow
through all fixed-income security financing transactions.
The measure thus encompasses all financing transactions
reported by the dealers.Moreover,because securities in and
securities out are reported by asset class,net financing can be
computed to exclude corporates so as to generate a time series
consistent with respect to the covered asset classes.7
On May 19,2004,overall net financing was $147 billion
(Table 1,combined securities out minus combined securities
in),considerably less than net repo financing.In addition,net
financing has consistently been far less than net repo financ-
ing for at least the past decade (Chart 1).Much ofthe increase
in net repo financing in recent years can thus be explained by
the measure’s exclusion of transactions that are essentially
equivalent to repos.Moreover,an examination of net financ-
ing including and excluding corporates shows that some of
the increase in net repo financing since July 2001 is likely
explained by the inclusion of corporates since that time.
Although net financing is consistently far below net repo
financing, it is apparent that net financing did indeed
increase in recent years. In particular, net financing rose
from mid-2000 to mid-2003,a period in which the federal
funds target rate dropped from 6.50 percent to 1.00 percent.
Net financing then fell sharply in spring 2004 amid growing
expectations of a near-term increase in the funds rate.
www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 3
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Notes: The chart plots net financing (“securities out” minus “securities in”) and 
net repo financing (repos minus reverse repos) by week from July 6, 1994, to 
May 19, 2004. The financing involves U.S. Treasury securities, agency debt securities, 
and mortgage-backed securities for the whole sample and, except where noted, 
corporate debt securities since July 4, 2001.
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Financing, Leverage, and Risk Taking
While net financing accurately measures the funds borrowed
by primary dealers through fixed-income security financing
transactions,it is itself an imperfect gauge of dealer lever-
age.In particular,it does not take into account the capital of
primary dealers.Net financing divided by total assets (net
financing plus capital) would be a better leverage measure,
but the capital of the primary dealer units is generally not
observed.
It is also worth noting that leverage captures only one
dimension of risk taking.Leverage is related to risk taking
because,for a given set of positions,higher leverage puts
more capital at risk.However,just as leverage changes over
time,so does the riskiness of positions,often making the net
effect on capital at risk ambiguous.For example,a dealer
could increase its leverage while decreasing the riskiness of
its positions,causing its capital at risk to rise,fall,or remain
the same.
Another way in which leverage and risk taking diverge is
through speculative positions that do not affect net financ-
ing.For example,if a dealer buys a thirty-year bond and sells
a three-month bill,the net effect on financing may be zero.
An additional way is through forward,futures,and options
positions,which for the most part do not require financing.
As a result,if a dealer buys and finances,say,a ten-year note
and sells a ten-year-note futures contract,its net financing
will increase even though the two positions might largely
offset one another in terms of risk exposure.
Primary dealer positions data include forward positions
and thus provide evidence on dealer risk taking beyond the
financing data.8 Net positions (in Treasuries,agencies,and
mortgage-backed securities) tended to track net financing
between mid-1994 and mid-2000,but the measures diverged
markedly afterward (Chart 2). In fact, net positions have
shown no long-term increase in recent years,suggesting that
the upswing in net financing that has occurred is not attrib-
utable to an increase in net positions and is thus not clearly
associated with greater risk taking.(It is worth noting,how-
ever,that the net positions measure is an imperfect indicator
of risk taking for many of the reasons that net financing is;
the relationship between these two measures is discussed
further in the appendix on page 7.)
Dealer Financing,Interest Rates,
and Interest Rate Volatility
Some market analysts have suggested that low short-term
interest rates have spurred a large number of carry trades in
recent years,thereby increasing investors’exposure to inter-
est rate changes. A resultant concern is that increases in
interest rates could lead to large trading losses, a rapid
deleveraging,and high volatility.By comparison,our analy-
sis suggests that dealer borrowing has grown only modestly,
and that the increase is not associated with greater position
taking. Nonetheless, it is worth examining the extent to
which our preferred leverage measure—net financing—is
related to interest rates and interest rate volatility.
We analyze the relationship between net financing,inter-
est rates,and interest rate volatility using correlation and
regression techniques.The variables we employ,in addition
to net financing,are the fed funds target rate (the primary
tool of monetary policy),the three-month/fed funds spread
(a predictor of future monetary policy),the ten-year/three-
month spread (a predictor of the business cycle [Estrella and
Mishkin 1996]),Moody’s Baa/Aaa spread (an indicator of
credit quality),and implied interest rate volatility (a proxy
for expected future volatility).Summary statistics for the
variables are presented in Table 2.
Concurrent Relationships among Dealer Financing,
Interest Rates, and Interest Rate Volatility
Implied interest rate volatility is the only variable signifi-
cantly correlated with net financing in terms of weekly
changes,and the relationship is not especially strong eco-
nomically or statistically (Table 3).One explanation for the
negative relationship is that increased volatility elevates the
amount of dealer capital at risk,causing dealers to reduce
their net positions because of capital constraints.9A second
explanation has causality going the other way,with dealer
speculation stabilizing security prices.10Additional evidence
we present later is consistent with both hypotheses.
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: The chart plots net financing (“securities out” minus “securities in”) and net 
positions involving U.S. Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and mortgage-
backed securities by week from July 6, 1994, to May 19, 2004.
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Note that our statistical analysis is undertaken in terms of
changes,and not levels,because the variables exhibit time
trends over the sample period.11An analysis in terms of lev-
els would produce results that are quite different,and that
might seem strong,but that are in fact spurious and mislead-
ing.For example,the fed funds target rate is highly nega-
tively correlated with net financing in terms of levels,but the
more appropriate tabulation in terms of changes reveals
essentially no correlation.
Dynamic Relationships among Dealer Financing,
Interest Rates, and Interest Rate Volatility
To capture the dynamic relationships among the variables,
we regress weekly changes in the variables on lagged weekly
changes in the other variables,as well as on their own lagged
values.Because the independent variables in the regressions
are lagged,we can interpret the coefficients as predictive,
that is,a change today in an independent variable predicts a
future change in the dependent variable. The coefficients
quantify average effects,based on past data,and do not show
that one variable causes another.12
We find that increases in the fed funds target rate and in
the three-month/fed funds spread precede decreases in net
financing (Table 4,row 1).The coefficient of -0.70 for the fed
funds rate,for example,implies that a one-time increase in
the funds rate of 1 basis point is followed,on average,by a
decrease in net financing of $700 million over thirteen
weeks,holding other variables constant.Increases in the fed
funds rate,or expectations thereof,may be inducing dealers
to reduce their exposure to rising rates,leading to a decline
in net financing.
Increases in implied interest rate volatility are also found
to precede decreases in net financing.The coefficient of -1.78
for implied interest rate volatility (Table 4,row 1) suggests
that a rise in volatility of 1 basis point predicts a decline 
in net financing of $1.78 billion.This finding is consistent
with the argument that dealers face capital constraints.As
volatility increases,so does the riskiness of positions,causing
dealers to unwind positions and reduce net financing.
Not only do interest rates and volatility help to explain net
financing,but net financing helps to explain interest rates
and volatility (Table 4,column 1).An increase in net financ-
ing of $1 billion is expected to be followed by a decrease of
0.34 basis points in the fed funds rate over the next thirteen
weeks and a fall of 0.32 basis points in implied interest rate
volatility,although neither relationship is especially strong
statistically. The interest rate finding is consistent with 
the argument that dealers reduce net financing in anticipa-
tion of an increase in the fed funds rate;the volatility finding
supports the hypothesis that dealer positions tend to stabi-
lize asset prices.
Net financing is not significantly related to either the ten-
year/three-month spread,which predicts recessions,or the
Table 2
Summary Statistics for Net Financing of Primary Dealers 
and Other Market Variables
Level Weekly Change
Standard Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
Net financing 84.1 53.0 0.11 19.5
Fed funds target rate 430.8 184.9 -0.63 9.4
Three-month/fed funds spread -20.7 22.7 -0.01 11.2
Ten-year/three-month spread 148.6 113.5 0.15 14.2
Implied interest rate volatility 106.4 17.0 -0.06 8.6
Moody’s Baa/Aaa spread 81.6 23.6 0.00 4.0
Source:Authors’calculations,based on data from Bloomberg L.P.and Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.
Notes:Net financing involves U.S.Treasury securities,agency debt securities,and
mortgage-backed securities.Treasury yields are used in the three-month/fed funds
and ten-year/three-month spread variables.Implied interest rate volatility is the 
Merrill Lynch MOVE index,a weighted average of implied volatilities of the two-year
(20 percent),five-year (20 percent),ten-year (40 percent),and thirty-year (20 per-
cent) Treasury securities.The Baa/Aaa spread is calculated using Moody’s corporate
bond indexes.All variables are measured as of the Wednesday close.Net financing 
is in billions of dollars;the other variables are in basis points.The sample period is
July 6,1994,to May 19,2004 (516 weeks).
Table 3
Correlations of Weekly Changes of Net Financing of Primary Dealers and Other Market Variables
Fed Funds  Three-Month/ Ten-Year/ Implied Interest Moody’s 
Net Financing Target Rate Fed Funds Spread Three-Month Spread Rate Volatility Baa/Aaa Spread 
Net financing 1
Fed funds target rate 0.04 1
Three-month/fed funds spread -0.01 -0.50*** 1
Ten-year/three-month spread -0.00 -0.29*** -0.20*** 1
Implied interest rate volatility -0.08* -0.04 0.01 0.16*** 1
Moody’s Baa/Aaa spread -0.01 -0.11** -0.02 -0.02 0.06 1
Source:Authors’calculations,based on data from Bloomberg L.P.and Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. **Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 11, NUMBER 3
Baa/Aaa spread,which tends to increase during recessions.It
therefore appears to be unrelated to expectations about
changes in the business cycle.
Conclusion
Data reported to the Federal Reserve cover primary dealer
financing activities involving U.S. Treasury securities,
agency debt securities,mortgage-backed securities,and cor-
porate debt securities.While some market analysts argue
that the data show a considerable rise in dealer leverage in
recent years,our analysis indicates that dealer borrowing
involving fixed-income securities has grown only modestly.
Moreover,the increase that has occurred is not associated
with increased net positions,so there is little evidence to
suggest greater risk taking by primary dealers.
We do,however,find evidence to support the idea that
dealer leverage is related to interest rates and volatility.In
particular,increases in interest rates and volatility precede
decreases in financing while decreases in financing precede
increases in interest rates and volatility.We leave it to future
research to explore these relationships more fully and to
ascertain the reasons behind them.
Notes
The authors thank Sally Chen, Robert Elsasser, Spence Hilton, Charles Jones,
Frank Keane, Jim Mahoney, and Deborah Perelmuter for helpful comments.
1. Press reports on carry trades and the implications of higher interest rates
include “Slow Rate Gain Will Mean Less Pain,” Financial Times, March 11, 2004,
“Carry Trade Flirts with Danger if Rates Rise,” Dow Jones International News,
April 7, 2004, and “The Unravelling Mystery,” Financial Times, May 10, 2004.
2. The current list of primary dealers is available at <http://www.newyorkfed
.org/markets/pridealers_current.html>.
3. The reporting forms, instructions, and releases are available at <http://
www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealers.html>.
4. Dealers also report data for certain specific issues. Some of these data are
reported daily.
5. The positions and financing data have been released with a one-week lag
only since January 15, 2004; previously, there was a four-week lag.
6. This fact is apparent from the financing breakdowns observed in the earlier
data: securities in are broken down by reverse repos, securities borrowed, and
securities received as pledge, whereas securities out are broken down by repos,
securities lent, securities pledged, and collateralized loans. To the extent that
other securities are used as collateral in the securities borrowing transactions,
they show up under securities pledged. However, securities pledged offset only
a small share of securities borrowed (for example, the share was 15 percent on
June 27, 2001).
7. Net financing is still not a perfectly comparable measure over time, how-
ever, because securities in and securities out are calculated from July 6, 1994,
to June 27, 2001, using the subcategories of financing identified in endnote 6.
Total securities in and securities out were not reported over that period.
Nonetheless, there is no abrupt change in reported financing from the last
week under the old reporting procedures to the first week under the new 
procedures, suggesting that the reporting change does not substantively affect
the comparability of net financing over time.
8. Although dealers reported futures and options positions between July 6,
1994, and June 27, 2001, for consistency we exclude them from our analysis.
9. Grossman and Vila (1992) offer an early study of the effect of leverage con-
straints on trading activity.
10. At least since Friedman (1953), economists have debated whether financial
speculation stabilizes or destabilizes asset prices. Adrian (2004) presents a
model in which the state of the economy determines whether arbitrageurs stabi-
lize or destabilize prices.
11. The fed funds target rate, the ten-year/three-month spread, and the Baa/Aaa
spread have unit roots but are not cointegrated. Net financing and implied 
interest rate volatility have time trends.
12. Our estimated system of equations can be interpreted as a vector autoregres-
sion. In robustness tests, we find that the system is stable.
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Table 4
Determinants and Effects of Net Financing
Independent Variable
Fed Funds  Three-Month/ Ten-Year/ Implied Interest  Moody’s 
Dependent Variable Net Financing Target Rate Fed Funds Spread Three-Month Spread Rate Volatility Baa/Aaa Spread 
Net financing -1.65** -0.70** -0.99** -0.29 -1.78*** 0.02
Fed funds target rate -0.34* 0.99*** 1.55*** 0.14  -0.35 0.18
Three-month/fed funds spread 0.03 -0.13 -1.14*** 0.30* 0.09 -0.25
Ten-year/three-month spread -0.08 -1.11*** -0.39 -0.35 0.07 0.09
Implied interest rate volatility -0.32* -0.53*** -0.48* -0.36*** -0.60** -0.84**
Moody’s Baa/Aaa spread 0.03 -0.19** -0.11 -0.13** 0.38*** -0.30*
Source:Authors’calculations,based on data from Bloomberg L.P.and Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Notes:Each row summarizes the results of a regression of the weekly changes of the dependent variable on thirteen lags of the weekly changes of the independent variables.
For each independent variable,we report the sum of coefficients for all thirteen lags.The asterisks refer to the test that the sum is different from zero.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. **Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.References
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As we explain in the text, dealers undertake financing
activities to meet delivery obligations on the positions they
take. One might therefore expect to see a close relationship
between net financing and net positions. In fact, primary
dealers’ net financing involving U.S. Treasury securities,
agency debt securities, and mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) tracked net positions in these securities fairly well
between mid-1994 and mid-2000 (Chart 2 in the text).
Since mid-2000, however, the two series have diverged,
with net financing increasingly exceeding net positions.
Net financing can differ from net positions for several 
reasons:
● Dealers pay for purchased securities out of available funds
and do not finance the purchases. Net positions thus increase
without any change in net financing.
● Dealers, in their role as market makers for financing trans-
actions, finance their customers’ long positions out of avail-
able funds. Dealers thus receive securities, reducing their net
financing, without any change in positions. (Dealers could
also offset these transactions with other counterparties, in
which case net financing would not change.)
● Dealers have positions that have not yet settled because of
the time lag between trade execution and settlement. The
transfer of securities and cash often occurs the day after a
trade. However, securities that have not yet been issued do
not settle until issuance day. Moreover, in the MBS market,
many trades do not settle for a number of weeks. Such
transactions are, in effect, forward contracts. These transac-
tions are reported as positions once they are executed, but
financing occurs only when the trades settle. This third 
factor can either increase or decrease net financing relative
to net positions; thus, it is the only one of the three reasons
that can explain why net financing exceeds net positions.
The overall relationship between net financing and net
positions is further illuminated by examining the relation-
ship across asset classes. Net positions are close to, or exceed,
net financing for Treasuries, agencies, and corporates. In
contrast, net financing greatly exceeds net positions for
MBS, and the gap has widened over time (see chart). MBS
issuance increased sharply in the low-interest-rate environ-
ment of recent years because of the surge in refinancings and
new mortgages. Dealers apparently responded to this devel-
opment by raising their long positions in MBS that had 
settled, perhaps because of market-making considerations,
while boosting their short positions in MBS that had not
settled, perhaps to hedge their long positions. Thus, net
financing of mortgage-backed securities has risen, while net
positions have not.
Appendix: The Relationship between Net Financing and Net Positions
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: The chart plots net financing (“securities out” minus “securities in”) and 
net positions by week from July 4, 2001, to May 19, 2004.
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